GitHub Threat Detector ships 17 heuristic analyzers that collectively cover the most common supply chain attack patterns seen in open-source repositories. Each rule is assigned a severity level —Documentation Index
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critical, high, or medium — and operates against one or more data sources collected by the collect command. Understanding which rules require which flags helps you make deliberate trade-offs between scan coverage and collection time.
All Rules
| Rule ID | Category | Severity | Required Data |
|---|---|---|---|
workflow-file-change | CI/CD Attacks | high | Events only |
pr-target-abuse | CI/CD Attacks | critical | Events only |
workflow-run-from-fork | CI/CD Attacks | critical | Workflow runs (--actions) |
release-actor-anomaly | Release Tampering | critical | Events + releases (--releases) + contributors (--contributors, optional) |
rapid-releases | Release Tampering | high | Releases (--releases) |
force-push-default | Push Anomalies | high | Events only |
rapid-sequential-pushes | Push Anomalies | medium | Events only |
delete-branch-protection | Push Anomalies | high | Events only |
fork-spike | Push Anomalies | medium | Events only |
new-actor-ci-change | Social Engineering | high | Events only |
member-added-suspicious | Social Engineering | medium | Events only |
repo-made-public | Social Engineering | high | Events only |
commit-date-gap | Commit Tampering | critical | Commits (--commits) |
null-committer-email | Commit Tampering | critical | Commits (--commits) |
issue-prompt-injection | AI Workflow Abuse | critical | Events + contributors (--contributors) |
issue-rapid-close | AI Workflow Abuse | high | Events only |
ai-workflow-unsafe-input | AI Workflow Abuse | critical | Workflow files (--workflow-files) |
Severity Breakdown
Critical
7 rules — Findings at this level indicate a high-confidence indicator of
compromise or active exploitation. Treat every critical finding as requiring
immediate human review.Rules:
pr-target-abuse, workflow-run-from-fork, release-actor-anomaly,
commit-date-gap, null-committer-email, issue-prompt-injection,
ai-workflow-unsafe-inputHigh
7 rules — Findings are strong signals worth prompt investigation. Some
may have legitimate explanations (e.g. an intentional force push), but each
warrants a short audit.Rules:
workflow-file-change, rapid-releases, force-push-default,
delete-branch-protection, new-actor-ci-change, repo-made-public,
issue-rapid-closeMedium
3 rules — Findings provide useful context and may indicate automation
or misconfigurations. Review in batch during regular security audits.Rules:
rapid-sequential-pushes, member-added-suspicious, fork-spikeData Collection Requirements
Different detectors require different data sources. Passing extra flags tocollect increases coverage at the cost of additional GitHub API calls.
| Flag | Data Collected | Unlocks Rules |
|---|---|---|
| (none) | Public GitHub events (past 90 days) | workflow-file-change, pr-target-abuse, force-push-default, rapid-sequential-pushes, delete-branch-protection, fork-spike, new-actor-ci-change, member-added-suspicious, repo-made-public, issue-rapid-close |
--actions | Workflow run records from the Actions API | workflow-run-from-fork |
--releases | Full release history via the Releases API | release-actor-anomaly, rapid-releases |
--contributors | Contributor list from the Repository API | Improves accuracy of release-actor-anomaly; required for issue-prompt-injection |
--commits | Per-commit metadata (author/committer dates and emails) | commit-date-gap, null-committer-email |
--workflow-files | Raw YAML content of .github/workflows/ files | ai-workflow-unsafe-input |